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International Skating Union v Commission:
Pre-authorisation Rules and Competition Law
Andrea Cattaneo∗
Judgment of 16 December 2020, International Skating
Union v Commission, T-93/18, ECLI:EU:T:2020:610.
Sports Governing bodies can employ a pre-
authorisation system for events, provided this is propor-
tionate to the pursuit of a legitimate objective.
I. Legal Context
On 16 December 2020, the EU General Court (GC)
partially rejected the appeal of the International Skating
Union (ISU) against the decision of the Commission
(C (2017) 8230 final), holding that rules that severely
penalise athletes for taking parts in unsanctioned events
are contrary to EU competition law.
II. Facts
In 2014, two international speed skaters filed a complaint
with the EU Commission about the eligibility rules of
the ISU. The ISU is the sole international governing body
responsible for regulating and administering speed skat-
ing and figure skating. As well as being the regulator, the
ISU organises the most important international compe-
titions in the discipline, including the European and the
World Cup speed skating championships.
The two skaters wanted to take part in an international
competition organised by Icederby International, a third-
party event organiser which was promising athletes prize
money higher than the average offered in ISU events.
Under the ISU Constitution and General Regulations,
individuals may become ineligible if they take part in
competitions that are not authorised by the governing
body. The rule applies to any participant, including
coaching staff and referees, and provides for sanctions
ranging from a warning, to a life ban in the event of
breach.
In their complaint, the skaters claimed that the ISU
rules had the effect of deterring athletes from taking part
in competitions not officially sanctioned, in the fear of
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being banned from events that are the pinnacle of their
sport. Consequently, the ISU was accused of using its reg-
ulatory power to prevent competitors from successfully
organising speed skating event.
Despite a series of amendments made by the ISU
in 2016, the Commission found in 2017 that the
eligibility rules were in breach of Article 101 TFEU (Case
AT.40208—International Skating Union’s Eligibility
Rules). The Commission held that the rules adopted
by the ISU and its members constituted a decision of
an association of undertakings that had as its object
the restriction of competition in the market for the
organisation and commercialisation of speed skating
events. The rules prevented third-party competitors
from organising international speed skating events, by
threatening to impose severe sanctions on the athletes
that would participate. The rules also restricted the
freedom of athletes to engage in economic activities.
Finally, the restrictive effects were further strengthened
by the Appeals Arbitration Rules. Under the exclusive
jurisdiction granted to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS), athletes have no choice but to submit disputes to
the CAS, an arbitral body that tends to adjudicate on the
basis of Swiss Law and not EU law.
The counterclaims made by the ISU were not success-
ful. The ISU referred to a number of objectives that the
authorisation system was pursuing, including the protec-
tion of health and safety of participants, the protection of
the integrity of the competition and the good function-
ing of the sport (Case AT.40208—International Skating
Union’s Eligibility Rules, paragraph 213).
In February 2018, the ISU filed an appeal against the
Decision to the GC, putting forward, among other pleas,
that the Commission was wrong in its classification of
the rules as restriction by object, in its assessment of the
inherency and the proportionality of the eligibility rules
and, finally, in its conclusion that the arbitration rules
reinforced the restrictive effects of the system.
In the judgment of 16 December 2020, the GC dis-
missed the action of the ISU, while annulling the Com-
mission Decision in the Articles referring to the ISU arbi-
tration rules and their role in reinforcing the restrictive
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III. Analysis
In addressing the pleas submitted by the ISU, the Court
referred to the CJEU’s case law (Judgment of 16 July
2015, ING Pensii, C-172/14, EU:C:2015:484, paragraph
33), holding that to determine whether an agreement is
restrictive by object, account must be taken of its objec-
tives and the context of which it forms part (Judgment of
16 December 2020, International Skating Union v Com-
mission, T-93/18, ECLI:EU:T:2020:610, paragraph 67).
The general context is one in which Sports Governing
Bodies (SGBs) can exercise a monopolistic power over
the regulation of their sector, which necessarily spills over
to the economic activity of those that engage within it.
SGBs employ authorisation rules to ensure control over
the organisational structure of the sector they oversee.
The CJEU assessed the legitimacy of similar rules in
MOTOE (Judgment of 1 July 2008, C-49/07, EU:C:2008:
376), when a third-party organiser failed to obtain autho-
risation to stage a competition from the Greek Motor-
cycling Federation, which itself organised such events.
MOTOE claimed that this constituted an abuse of a dom-
inant position under Article 102 TFEU. The Court held
that undistorted competition must be protected when
rules “[e]ntrust a legal person which itself organises and
commercially operates competitions, with the task of des-
ignating the persons authorised to organise those compe-
titions and to determine the conditions under which they
are organised.” (MOTOE C-49/07, EU:C:2008:376, para-
graph 51). This inherently creates conflicts of interest (AG
Kokott’s Opinion in MOTOE C-49/07, EU:C:2008:376,
paragraph 98): as it grants the regulator the possibility to
prevent access by competitors to the market, it may lead
to “inevitable abuse” (Stephen Weatherill, Principles and
Practice in EU Sports Law (OUP 2017) 253).
While MOTOE was argued under Article 102 TFEU,
the Court rejected the claim of the ISU that this prevented
its application to the case at hand. By citing the judgment
of 28 February 2013, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Con-
tas (C-1/12, EU:C:2013:127, paragraphs 88 and 92), the
Court held that the same principles can be employed in
cases concerning the application of Article 101 TFEU.
The qualification of these rules as abusive or unlawful
restrictions depends on the objectives pursued. In this
regard, the Court made reference to Article 165 TFEU,
which states that the Union shall take account ‘[O]f the
specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary
activity and its social and educational function’ and
that its action is ‘[A]imed at developing the European
dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness
in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies
responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical
and ethical integrity of sportsmen and sportswome[n]’
(paragraph 78). Framing a rule as pursuing the objective
of protecting the integrity of sport has therefore clear
merits under the assessment of the CJEU. This is
confirmed in established case law (judgment of 18
July 2006, Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission,
C-519/04 P, EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 43). Other objec-
tives subsumed in Article 165 TFEU are the protection
of the health and safety of participants (AG Kokott’s
Opinion in MOTOE C-49/07, EU:C:2008:376, paragraph
90), and the protection of the structure and functioning
of the system (judgment of 13 April 2000, Lehtonen and
Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fédération
royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball C-176/96 (FRBSB)
[2000] ECR I-02681, paragraph 54).
SGBs can therefore legitimately refer to a range
of objectives to justify conducts that have restrictive
effects on the market. However, in the context of the
analysis under Article 101(1) TFEU, the Court has to
consider whether the effects caused by the restrictions are
inherent and proportionate to the pursuit of the objectives
(Judgments of 19 February 2002, Wouters and Others,
C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraph 97, and of 18 July
2006, Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission, C-519/04
P, EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 42). Even when authori-
sation rules are inherent (Judgment of 16 December
2020, International Skating Union v Commission, T-93/18,
ECLI:EU:T:2020:610, paragraph 102), these effects must
still be proportionate to the objectives pursued. In ISU,
the GC held that the regulatory power of the SGBs
should ‘[b]e made subject to restrictions, obligations
and review’, to ensure that such power is not exercised
to distort the competition on the market (Judgment
of 16 December 2020, International Skating Union v
Commission, T-93/18, ECLI:EU:T:2020:610, paragraph
70). Authorisation criteria must therefore be clearly
defined, transparent, non-discriminatory, reviewable
and capable of ensuring third-party organisers effective
access to the relevant market (ibid. paragraph 88). The
Court highlighted that the criteria used by ISU left
the SGBs a broad discretion to reject the application
and this could give rise to arbitrary treatment (ibid.
paragraph 110).
In its sixth plea, the ISU contested the decision of the
Commission which considered that the ISU arbitration
rules, mandating participants to refer disputes to arbi-
tration, reinforced the restrictive effects of the eligibility
rules, albeit not constituting an infringement in their own
right. Mandatory arbitration clauses are very common
in sport, and often considered necessary to maintain
its smooth functioning. Even when challenged in their
own rights, arbitration clauses have been considered
legitimate, although SGBs were required to define them
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(Brussels Court of Appeal, Judgment of 18 August
2018). In its assessment, the GC drew on the Judgment
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR,
2 October 2018, Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland,
CE:ECHR:2018:1002JUD004057510, paragraph. 98)
holding that rules granting exclusive jurisdiction to an
arbitral body may be justified in light of the specific nature
of the sporting sector and the benefits of having disputes
heard by a specialised court capable of adjudicating
quickly and economically (Judgment of 16 December
2020, International Skating Union v Commission, T-93/18,
ECLI:EU:T:2020:610, paragraph 156). Furthermore,
while athletes are bound by these mandatory arbitration
rules, they are still entitled to seek damages arising
from an infringement of Article 101 TFEU before a
national court of a Member State (ibid. paragraph 159).
The Court also noted that athletes and third parties
may file complaints with the Commission or with
national competition authorities, thereby concluding
that the arbitration system does not compromise the full
effectiveness of EU competition law (ibid. paragraph 161).
As such, arbitration clauses do not reinforce the restrictive
effects of eligibility rules.
IV. Practical Significance
While the Court upheld the decision of the Commission,
it is not all bad news for the ISU and other SGBs. The
Court has confirmed that the use of eligibility rules by
an entity engaged in commercial activities in the very
same sector inherently raises conflicts of interest. In this
regard, the case fits well within the case law of the CJEU
and follows the line tracked by MOTOE, OTOC, and
the decision-practice of the Commission in FIA (COMP
36.638, Notification by FIA/FOA of agreements relating
to the FIA Formula One World Championships). FIA in
particular could be interpreted as suggesting that the way
to resolve this conflict is by separating the SGBs’ commer-
cial function from the regulatory function. However, it
must be noted that in the case this solution was proposed
by the party under investigation. While SGBs may see this
as a viable solution, it is not demanded in any way by the
CJEU. The combination of the regulatory and commercial
functions is not, per sè, an unlawful barrier to entry for
competitors on the market.
Following the footprint of Meca-Medina, the Judgment
in ISU confirms the freedom of SGBs to adopt and
implement authorisation rules which pursue legitimate
objectives. Even more importantly, SGBs maintain a
margin of discretion in identifying their objectives,
which can also include the protection of their own
economic interests (Judgment of 16 December 2020,
International Skating Union v Commission, T-93/18,
ECLI:EU:T:2020:610, paragraph 109). However, SGBs
have an obligation to ensure that these rules are framed
in an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory way
and stay clear from any attempts to foreclose the market
and advance the commercial interests to the detriment
of competitors (Andrea Cattaneo and Richard Parrish,
Sports Law in the European Union (Wolters Kluwer, 2020)
72).
This discussion may be of great interest for those con-
sidering breakaway leagues scenario. Under the CJEU’s
case law, there is nothing inherently unlawful in adopting
authorisation rules, and in the attempt to circumvent
them for the breakaway league organisers. The matter
of contention would be whether these conducts pursue
legitimate sporting objectives, and they do so in a way that
mitigates any existing conflicts of interest.
The GC’s judgment can be further appealed to the
Court of Justice.
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